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BOOK REVIEWS
The three books under review epitomize, in a way, the present situation.
justice Vanderbilt recognizes the need for radical improvements in legal
procedure and at least intimates that new techniques for dealing with our
terminology must constitute a fundamental part of any important improvement. Mr. Philbrick illustrates the preoccupation with trial-success that
characterizes our law schools today to the exclusion of their more important
functions. Professor Lasswell suggests some new approaches and techniques
that might very well be adapted to the problems of legal semantics. Unfortunately the problems remain virtually untouched. The garrulous goddess
continues to babble without a competent interpreter.
LEE LOEv NGERt
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, by Geoffrey Chevalier Cheshire.*
gow: Jackson, Son & Company, 1948. Pp. 90. 6s.

Glas-

Because International Contracts is in fact a lecture delivered before a
diversified audience at the University of Glasgow, it might be supposed that
the work is merely a popularization of well-known legal principles. Such is
most certainly not the case. In the preface to the third edition of his standard
work on English conflict of laws, Professor Cheshire expressed dissatisfaction
with the treatment given therein to the contract conflicts law.' This lucid and
brilliantly written lecture is Professor Cheshire's attempt to amend and reanalyze certain topics in this area.
According to the 19th century English scholar Westlake, the "proper
law" of the contract (the law which governs a contract generally) is the law
of that country with which the contract has "the most real connection." 2
However, English opinions have consistently stated that the proper law of
the contract is that law which the parties intend to apply. In most cases these
different theories will lead to the same result. If the parties have expressed
no intention as to governing law, an intention will be presumed in "the light
of the subject matter and of the surrounding circumstances."' The presumption will normally select the law of that country which is most substantially
connected with the contract. But when the parties have expressly agreed to
be bound by the law of a country having no or perhaps only a slight factual
connection with the transaction the theories may lead to practical differences.
Professor Cheshire launches a heavy attack on the intention of the parties rule
if that rule is interpreted to mean that the parties are permitted an unrestricted
t Member, Minneapolis Bar.
*Vinerian Professor of English Law, University of Oxford; Fellow
Master of the Bench of Lincoln's Inn.

of All Souls;

1. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, iV-V (3rd ed. 1947).
2. WESTLAKCE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 289 (6th ed. 1922).
3. Bowen L. J. in Jacobs v. CrEdit Lyonnais, 12 Q.B.D. 589, 599-600 (884),
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choice of law to govern their contractual arrangement. The limits on choice of
law by the expressed agreement of the parties is the central theme of the
lecture's first part.
At the outset Cheshire asserts that a single system of law does not necessarily govern all of the various questions which arise in contract matters. In
particular, a distinction must be drawn between the creation 4 of a contract and
the substance5 of an obligation once it has been formed. The parties have no
power to choose the law which governs the formation of a contract except that
they may choose the facts which will objectively localize the contract. Somewhat more latitude to choose is permitted when an agreement's substance is
in question. In holding to the view that party autonomy does not operate in
the case of a contract's formation, Cheslhire appeals to both logic and authority.
"A contract, so far as its valid creation is concerned, must in the nature of
things be subject to the law of the country with which it has the most real
connection." 6 The contrary position violates "elementary common sense." 7
Cheshire does not elaborate why this is true. Apparently he believes that
some law independent of the parties' choice must impress itself on their acts
when the acts are done. That law inevitably will control questions arising
under the contract.8 This position is sound only if the forum, when it decides
questions concerning an international contract, is supposed either to be enforcing contract rights created under a foreign law or to be fashioning a local
right on the pattern of an already created foreign right. Given these explanations and assuming that choice of law rules are determined by them, we may
agree that a forum should act only if the law of some jurisdiction has "imposed" an obligation on the parties. But are the possibilities necessarily exhausted by these conceptions of what a forum does in a conflicts case? Cannot a court look at all the facts in a transaction involving one or more foreign
countries and select any fact or combination of facts as the most important in
4. Cheshire treats as questions concerning creation of a contract: "Have the
parties reached agreement? Are they of full capacity? Have the formalities and other
requisites of a valid contract been observed? Is the contract illegal?" P. 19.
5. "The expression 'substance of the obligation' is not free from ambiguity, but it
includes the effects and consequences of a contract and questions connected with the
reciprocal rights and liabilities of the parties." P. 21.
6. P. 21. (Italics supplied)
7. P. 19.
8. "As a distinguished American judge once said: 'Some law must impose the obligation, and the parties have nothing whatever to do with that, no more than with whether
their acts are torts or crimes.' It is not for the parties to choose what law shall determine
the validity of their agreement; it is for the law to determine what agreements it will
govern." P. 19. "[A] faint connection with a foreign law cannot deprive the contract of
its essentially English character." P. 21.
Cheshire seems also to have been influenced by the idea that judicial jurisdiction
principles are determinative of choice of law rules. "It is idle to maintain that a court
can be deprived at the caprice of the parties of control over a contractual question which
it regards as subject to its authority." P. 19-20.
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establishing a connection with a jurisdiction the legal materials of which will
be consulted in deciding a case? If so, then cannot a court seize upon an
express choice of law statement agreed to by the parties and hold it the most
important fact in the situation ?9 No logical compulsion forbids the forum
from so using any expressed choice of law which the parties may care to make.
The English opinions contain statements granting t; the parties the widest choice of applicable law but Professor Cheshire cautions that we must look
to what the judges do and not what they say. He points out that in all cases
save one the law chosen was in fact the law of the country with which the
contract had its most substantial connections. In the single case, Vita Food
Productsv. Unus Shipping Co.,' 0 the Privy Council did give effect to a choice
of English law in a transaction that had practically no factual connection
with England. After a brief discussion this case is dismissed with: "It is
scarcely credible that it will survive as an authority."" But the authorities
other than Vita Food do not forbid the parties to choose the law applicable
to the creation of a contract. Merely because an opinion formulates a rule
which is broader than the case requires does not necessarily mean that the rule
as stated is an inaccurate proposition of law. Further while it is true that
Vita Food is in theory a Nova Scotia case 2 since it was decided by English
judges may it not represent authoritative English opinion on the question?
Professor Cheshire would also limit the choice of law governing the substance of an obligation to the law of a country with which the contract has
some factual connection. That such is English law is proved to his satisfaction
by a method similar to the one used in proving that English law does not allow
parties to choose the law controlling the creation of a contract: "in nearly all
cases [there is] some factual connection with the chosen country."" How
does this demonstrate the necessity of the connection? Apparently there is
no case refusing to apply a chosen law on the ground of no factual connection.
On the contrary an expressly chosen law has been applied in cases where the
law was not that of a country factually connected with the conduct of the
business at hand. This explains why Cheshire uses the phrase "in nearly all
cases" in the quotation above. The parties may submit themselves to the
judicial jurisdiction of any country in the world. In the English law an express submission to a forum amounts to a choice of the forum's law as well.
So by means of so-called arbitration clauses the parties may, under English
9. This point of view is worked out in detail by Professor Max Rheinstein. See
Book Review, 37 COL. L. REV. 327 (1937).
10. (1939) App. Gas. 277.
11. P. 33.
12. Vita Food was a decision of the Privy Council sitting as the highest court for

Nova Scotia.
13. P. 36.
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authority, select the law of any country to govern their contract. Professor
Cheshire admits that these cases present "a certain difficulty.' 4 But in them
the "chief evil of complete freedom of choice" is avoided. The "absurd and
irrational situation" arising from the choice of a law totally unrelated to the
transaction does not arise. The most real connection is hard to determine in
advance; therefore, a choice of "law which [the parties] know and approve
and . . . judges in whom they have confidence" is "convenient and desir-

able."" Amen. But why is it not equally convenient and desirable to permit
the choice of law without the mechanics of the arbitration clause. An elaborated and well-known commercial law such as England's might be very convenient for parties whose affairs have no factual connection with England.
If so, the choice of that law should be permitted them.
The practical needs of the commercial community rather than logic or
ambiguous authority should provide the basis for solving the problem of what
limits are to be placed on expressed choice of law by the parties. Of these
needs Professor Cheshire here tells us little though elsewhere he has recognized their importance.'
When entering into a contract involving foreign
facts, businessmen find that their lawyers are frequently unable to tell them
what law will be used to judge their conduct. The conflict of laws rules in
the contract area are many and confused. What a great help it would be if
the contractors could agree in advance what legal system will govern the
transaction. Is there any reason why parties should not be permitted this
method of introducing an element of certainty into their dealings? Cheshire
is disturbed about the possibility that a contract with no international aspects
will contain a choice of law other than that of the country in which all the
facts of the agreement are located. The specter of Henry and William, two
Englishmen, contracting in London to do acts in England but providing that
their contracts be governed by French law haunts the pages of this lecture. Is
it necessary to deprive parties of a legitimate tool in order to guard against
this unusual case? In such a case a forum might well decline to be bound
by the choice of the parties, since it would be difficult for anyone to show
that a reasonable commercial purpose was being served. The exclusive concern of the jurisdiction in which all the facts are centered can easily be recognized by way of an exception to a general rule permitting choice of law by the
parties.17 There is no need to deny totally nor to limit severely a rule
which serves the needs of modern commerce.
14. P. 41.
15. P. 43-4.
16. "Private International Law is no more an exact science than is any other part
of the law of England; it is not scientifically founded upon the reasoning of jurists, but
it is beaten out on the anvil of experience." CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 55
(3d ed. 1947).

17. 2

RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS;

A COMPARATIVE STUDY 428 (1947).

BOOK REVIEWS
In the second half of his lecture, Cheshire outlines in detail his suggestion
that a single law should not be used to solve all the various problems which
may arise in contract litigation. Problems concerning capacity, the formation
of the contract, interpretation, the substance of the obligation, voidable contracts, performance and discharge are distinguished. Each category of
problems is discussed and some choice of law rule is suggested as the most
appropriate for each group. Depending on the question before the court a
given contract may therefore be subject to the law of one of the party's domicile, the law of the place of contracting, the proper law, the law of the place
of performance. or the law of the forum.
Professor Cheshire ignores the recent advice of Dr. Ernst Rabel: "To
split the incidents . . . [of a contract] is a grievous mistake. . .. ."I The
great difficulty which multiplicity creates for the practising lawyer can be
readily understood. What questions will arise in litigation? Before what
courts will the questions arise? How will the court classify the problem which
does come before it? How will the court define the various connecting factors
such as place of contracting, place of performance and the like? Yet to give
worthwhile advice when a contract is to be made a lawyer must make some
guess at the answers to these questions. The scholar's analysis can easily
become too fine for the practitioner.
If, as Professor Cheshire insists, "the subject requires to be more broken
down into separate fragments,""' exception may be taken to dividing the
subject analytically. Investigation may perhaps be most fruitful if it attempts to discover rules suitable for the diverse kinds of commercial transactions. While we do not know, we may guess that a study of choice of law
rules concerning the sale of goods may reveal, as appropriate, rules which
differ from those suitable for insurance contracts.
Some beginnings have been made along this line. In America contracts
calling for the payment of interest are universally recognized as subject to a
special rule when the question of usury is raised. Professor Lorenzen has
given us a special study of the conflict of laws relating to negotiable instruments2 0 and Professor Carnahan has published a detailed study of the cases
in the field of life insurance contracts.21 Some foreign statutory materials
have reflected this conviction that different types of contracts are to be
treated in different ways. The Polish statute of 1926 contains special rules
for contracts made on the Stock Exchange, in the retail trade, for professional
18. Id. at 483.
19. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, v (3d ed. 1947).

20.

LORENZEN, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS RELATING TO BILLS AND NOTES

21.

CARNAHAN,

CONFLICT OF LAws

AND LIFE INSURANCE

CONTRACTS

(1919).
(1942).
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services, for employment, et cetera.2 2 Similarly the 1948 Czechoslovak Act on
Private International Law distinguishes between contracts concerning immovables, those made on an exchange, sales contracts, insurance contracts, contracts for professional services and labor contracts. 23 Of course, this breakdown, too, adds to the difficulty of the lawyer's job; but the classifications,
drawn from the facts of business life, should be easier to apply than those
based on an analysis of the questions which may arise in contract litigation.
Also in such a division at least the desirability of the rules can be tested by
24
criteria drawn from the needs of the business world.
MONRAD G. PAULSENt
COURTS ON TRIAL:

MYTH AND REALITY IN

AMERICAN JUSTICE.

By

Jerome Frank. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. Pp. xii, 441. $5.
It has long seemed to me that book reviewers, a grubby crew at best, ought
always to honor their random readers with a sort of caveat lector-a full disclosure of such personal relationship, hot or cold, with a book's author as
prompts a prejudiced plug or a prejudiced panning. In just this spirit, let me
confess that I plan, with bias aforethought, both to plug and to pan Jerome
Frank's "Courts on Trial." As a passionate admirer, personal and professional, of Judge Frank, his works and his ways, I cannot but call his latest
book a brilliant, eloquent, wise, witty, go-buy-it-and-read-it job-all of which by
sheer happenstance, it is. As a congenitally cantankerous character who would
fall over backward any day to avoid the pleasure of over-praising a friend, I
cannot but stress the flaws I found in "Courts on Trial," even though their
argumentative mention here may seem perhaps to inflate them beyond their
actual or relative importance. So much by way of full-or fulsome-disclosure.
Coincidentally, full disclosure-in a slightly different sense-is the very
essence of Judge Frank's book. The Judge believes that judges should toss away
their robes and appear on the bench as what they are, men; one of his 32 chapters deals delightfully with the absurd and anti-democratic anachronism of the
judicial uniform. But the whole of his book is itself a disrobing of another and
more meaningful kind. With a forthrightness rare-even, in spots, unique-22. The statute is cited and discussed in KURATOWSKI, A General Outline of
Some Principles of Conflict of Laws in Poland, STUDIES IN POLISH AND COMPARATIVE
LAW 110 (1945).
23. Sec. 44-6 of the Act dated March 11, 1948, reprinted in 33 JOURNAL OF COMPARATIvF LEGISLATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (3rd series) 78, 83 (1949).
24. 2 RAHEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 440 (1947):
In conclusion, the task of the court is this: it has, in the absence of
an agreement, first, to state whether the individual facts of the contract
are colored by a certain law; if not, second, whether the contract belongs
to a class typically centering in a certain country. This inquiry has to
be done in full consideration of the circumstances personal and economical, but without inferring judicial or state policies.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.

